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To the foreign observer, Papua New Guinea 
is readily associated with violent gang crime, tribal 
fighting and electoral violence.  In the Highlands 
region, high-powered weapons render tribal fighting 
increasingly problematic, particularly in provinces 
hosting large-scale resource extraction operations 
such as Southern Highlands Province and Enga.  
This discussion paper, based on presentations made 
to an AusAID seminar, provides an overview of 
aspects of conflict in the contemporary Papua New 
Guinea Highlands.  
Beginning in the Southern Highlands, Weiner 
explores the nature of conflict in areas surrounding 
the Kutubu Oil Project, examining not only 
contemporary land disputes, but also the cultural 
milieu in which they occur.  Moving to Enga, 
Yala investigates the similarities and differences 
between ‘traditional’ and contemporary conflict in 
the Highlands, drawing primarily upon his personal 
experiences of conflict in Enga.  McLeod then 
provides perspectives on conflict in Simbu Province, 
with a particular focus upon the nature of ‘social 
rules’ in that area.  Collectively, these essays, all 
of which are based upon the authors’ extensive 
experiences in Papua New Guinea, seek to provide 
an insight into the nature of contemporary conflict in 
the Papua New Guinea Highlands.
CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN 
HIGHLANDS, PNG
 James Weiner
I’d like to talk about some aspects of conflict 
in New Guinea communal life in Southern 
Highlands Province (SHP). I come to you as an 
anthropologist who has spent over three years 
in Papua New Guinea (PNG), two and a half 
of them living in a village where I spoke the 
local dialect. I would thus like this talk to be 
a modest defence of anthropological practice – 
nothing can substitute for thorough, vernacular, 
in-depth understanding of a non-western mode 
of social life at the most local level. No other 
experience can provide one with the insight 
as to how profoundly differently Papua New 
Guineans conduct their social life in comparison 
with ourselves. My view is that PNG politics at 
the grandest level are not very far removed from 
such locally-engendered practices. 
The contribution 
of AusAID to 
this series is 
acknowledged 
with appreciation. 
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Western and New Guinean Forms of Sociality
Let me first try to draw a broad contrast 
between the way people of the Kutubu 
Oil Project Area and we English-speaking 
westerners “do” social life. Our own English-
derived western notion of social life starts with 
the irreducible “individual”, the “given” of social 
life. The individual is thought to be born as a 
unique organism– genetically, temperamentally, 
and in terms of history and identity. We 
westerners then pose “society” as a matter 
of deliberate, conscious, rational “contract” 
between discrete individuals, a contract entered 
into by those individuals for their common 
good. The social contract stipulates that it is in 
the interest of the individual to forego some of 
his/her passions, drives, strivings, and so forth 
in order to forge a functioning and positively-
valued social system in which the individual 
can pursue his/her interests with the maximum 
amount of freedom and yet also (under ideal 
conditions) serve the community or public 
interest as well. To sum up, we see the individual 
as “natural”, or “God-given”, and society as a 
human artifice set up to mediate the innate 
strivings and drives of the individual (in broad 
terms, self-preservation and the maximisation of 
property and comfort).
For many Papua New Guineans such as 
those within the Kutubu Oil Project Area, this 
scheme is exactly reversed. People are born not 
as unique individuals, but as already-connected– 
through bodily substance, ancestral intervention 
while in the womb, in terms of the series of 
debts and obligations that attended the marriage 
of one’s mother, by being nourished on the 
same land– to others within their social field. 
What is “natural” or “given” in social life is this 
web of connections. If this is the case, what 
then do people consciously and deliberately “do” 
themselves? Under these conditions, Papua New 
Guineans must consciously and deliberately 
“achieve” individuality– it is not a condition 
that is given to them at birth. They must 
strive to cut themselves off from others, to pre-
empt the duties of debt and obligation, to make 
themselves unique and powerful in the face of 
this convention which connects them to others.
But when one’s world is given to one as 
a total universe of connections, where one 
connection implies all the others in that world, 
to break one’s self off means to break one’s 
self off from the total world. To make one’s 
self different means finding a different “whole” 
world for one’s self, with a whole different set 
of connections. In other words, in the Foi social 
world, it is all or nothing. A quarrel, over 
property, over adultery, over sorcery accusation, 
inevitably leads to the departure of one of the 
disputing parties to another place, especially if 
powerful men are involved. 
I worked with the Foi, who are involved as 
landowners in the Kutubu oil project area. I had 
not been with them for long, collecting clan 
and individual genealogies and histories before 
I realized that their history is one of constant 
migrations, exiles, the taking in of refugees and 
granting them what we would call “land rights”. 
Their history is the history of disaffected men 
taking their retinue, that is, the fragment of 
their social universe remaining to them, leaving 
their natal residence, and migrating to other 
places. At these places, they are given access to 
and control of sites so that they can carry out 
the total range of subsistence tasks.  
I think it is important to understand that 
these quarrels and departures and migrations 
are the visible form that the normal state of 
affairs takes in this part of the world. They are 
not aberrations within the theoretically smooth 
functioning of a social organism, because 
there is no social organism as such. When 
people become disaffected from their nominal 
groups of affiliation, they do not assert their 
individuality and leave, for individuality is not 
the “default setting” of non-sociality for Papua 
New Guineans. Rather, they take a miniature 
fragment of the social world to which they 
belonged, in the form of immediate family 
and other assorted hangers-on and sympathisers, 
and go off and recreate another, albeit smaller, 
version of the social whole from which they 
have detached themselves. It is clan fragments 
that migrate, immigrate and emigrate, not 
individuals, and it is clan fragments that are 
taken in and given land, status and brides as 
clan groups. The consequences of fragmentation 
of groups then is not ultimately a set of atomised 
individuals, but smaller and smaller versions of 
a single global social totality. As Roy Wagner 
writes of the Daribi, households, clans, lineages 
and villages are “not so much building blocks” 
for a social order as much as they are “divisions 
and deconstructions” within it (1998). For 
both the Foi and the Daribi and many other 
Southern Highlands peoples, the “origin story” 
or “charter” for their “group” is the story of 
the fight or quarrel that led to their fissioning 
from some previous entity. These quarrels, the 
view of sociality that engenders them, and 
their consequences, are the real “elementary 
structures” of kinship in Southern Highlands 
Province and elsewhere in PNG.
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of Papua New Guinea. We can suggest, again to 
elaborate on the metaphor I am employing, that 
points of view must be distributed as widely as 
possible, at least in these public speech events.
There was never, therefore, a hard and fast 
rule concerning how much bridewealth one had 
to give in earlier times; there was only the 
communal assessment of a bridewealth as being 
proper or insufficient. Since the obligations of 
wife-takers to wife-givers was a continuing one, 
it was likely that agreement as to sufficiency 
of bridewealth at the time of a bride’s transfer 
did not preclude requests for additional payment 
in the future. What was important about 
distributive mechanisms of this sort was not 
exactly how much material resource was spread 
out within a social field but rather how wide 
one could expand one’s social network of 
indebtedness and obligation to others.
It is important to understand also that there 
is no such thing as a single transaction—be 
it of wealth, persons or land—in isolation. An 
agreed upon exchange is always a situational and 
temporary agreement at best. Usually, additional 
demands for further wealth are made after the 
initial exchange. As the items of exchange alter 
in value over time, so does the perception of 
the standing of the original exchange partners. 
Especially in the case of wealth paid for 
human life—bridewealth, childwealth, death 
compensation, etc.—there is the understanding 
that wealth can never replace human life or its 
potential but merely temporarily offsets its loss. 
Furthermore, it is the tension, as it were, of 
unbalanced and uncompleted exchanges which 
maintains the social relationship between the 
original parties. Any attempts to make it come 
out exactly even may stop the prolongation of 
balancing exchanges but would also bring the 
relationship to an end. That this relationship 
often originates in acts of violence or damage 
between the two parties does not negate the 
overall positive value that Papua New Guineans 
place on the fact of being in such relationships, 
full stop.
I was in Hegeso in 1988 when three men 
in their late twenties came down to the village 
from the Poroma area (Nembi Plateau region). 
They came inside the longhouse and sat down 
and started talking to the head men there. They 
said their uncle had been killed 25 years ago by 
a Hegeso man (who was still alive and was there 
at this encounter) when they were infants and 
now that they are men, they are coming down 
to demand their share of the compensation 
payment. The thing that floored me was the 
Hegeso men took this request very seriously and 
Bridewealth
The matter of distribution of resources and 
personnel, in any number of forms, some 
of which I will mention here, is of central 
importance to the articulation of Foi social 
activity as well as throughout PNG. Those of 
you who know something about village life in 
PNG also know that bridewealth distributions 
are always marked by verbal contests, arguments 
and the airing of disputes. If my characterisation 
of Foi sociality is correct– if, in other words, 
there can be no decomposition of social groups 
into component individuals, but only into 
smaller groups which retain the functions of 
the original group– then we should be able 
to confirm this in the kinds of distributive 
mechanisms associated with these groups.
We can begin to inspect it at its most 
basic level when we watch a Foi hunting party 
deciding how to distribute the various portions 
and cuts of an animal collectively trapped 
or killed. Considerations of, for example, the 
ownership of the dog involved, who first sighted 
the animal, who dealt the lethal blow, who may 
have been injured during the chase, who did the 
work of butchering and cooking, all contribute 
to determining the correct portions allotted to 
all. In line with what I have said about social 
convention, in such occasions, the “rules” of 
distribution are usually tacit and understood by 
all and rarely, except in an explanatory passage 
to the visiting anthropologist, articulated as 
“a rule”.  The coming of the government 
administration and Missionaries provided them 
with exposure to the idea that social law 
and customary action, including these tacit 
conventions of distribution of resources, were 
something that could be objectified, codified 
and altered by human effort, rather than 
as phenomena that were only revealed in 
the course of humans reacting to otherwise 
situational and contingent social engagements 
and encounters. 
Because social rules are not usually overtly 
articulated, as ethnographers such as Merlan 
and Rumsey (1991), Goldman (1983), A.J. 
Strathern (1975), M. Strathern (1974) and 
more recently Brison (1994) have demonstrated, 
communal agreement concerning the normative 
in social life is often reached after a protracted 
process of public argument and verbal 
contention. As Marilyn Strathern suggested in 
an early paper (1974), the idea that in a public 
dispute, all points of view should be aired 
and made visible, all person’s opinions should 
be voiced, is very important to achieving an 
acceptable resolution to a conflict in these areas 
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in fact wound up giving them a payment of 
shell wealth. These matters were still important 
in 1988, still inflected social relations between 
villages, clans and tribes. I don’t think the 
presence of large-scale developments has made 
them disappear at all. One of the public 
arguments I recorded in January 1994 at Pimaga, 
the government station at Kutubu, still involved 
the revelation of trans-generational inheritances 
of debts and blood feuds. Even though the 
conflicts at issue seemed to be the result of the 
new highway and the oil company’s presence, 
they needed to be foregrounded against these 
historical facts so that people could think they 
understood them.
The Role of Everyday Conflict
It must be understood that a good deal of 
contestation in PNG public life is precisely 
because the notion that there is a society 
consciously governed by a set of rules is not 
what orders people’s social encounters. Western 
observers look at such social life and label it 
“anarchic” and so it is—there is no “-archy” 
at all in New Guinea society. But this is 
not to say that social life is not governed by 
conventions—social life everywhere is governed 
by conventions. It’s just that such conventions 
are not in PNG ordered, made explicit, 
codified, gradated, attached with sanctions 
and enforcement procedures, etc. They are 
immanent in social life or emergent from it, 
rather than a set of ordering principles which 
“generates” it. Public contestation and dispute 
is what happens when one lives in such a 
milieu—conventions have to be revealed by 
peoples’ reactions to them, contingently and 
situationally but never permanently. Some of 
these conventions become well understood and 
objectified, and are then duly tendered to the 
anthropologist or colonial administrator or law 
reform commissioner. 
Control of Land within Clan Groupings
The terms with which PNG people defined 
their local group membership reflected this— 
PNG people have multiple ways of 
characterising their social allegiances— 
language, moiety, class, totem, locality, path, 
track and so forth. They tended to use the 
broadest and most inclusive level of membership 
they could in any given circumstance. A Foi 
person was characteristically a Foi, an uplands 
Foi as opposed to a Lake or lowlands Foi, a 
particular village-group person, a village person, 
a clan and sub-clan person. But the terms 
themselves were those of contrast—we are the 
speakers of dialect X, and they over there speak 
dialect Y; we are the people of the river bank, 
and they are the people of the hinterland; we 
are of the bigpela pisin and they are of liklik pisin, 
and so on. In Foi, local land-holding groups 
usually took their name from some feature in 
their country. This relationship was not totemic, 
it was merely descriptive and distinctive. 
In Hegeso, those So’onedobo men who 
inhabited territory near the “source” of the 
Mubi (the place where it emerges from its 
underground traverse) were differentiated from 
those other So’onedobo men whose land 
was near the site of the Hegeso longhouse. 
The former called themselves the “Ibuga” 
(ibu: ‘water; stream; river’; ga: ‘source, head’) 
So’onedobo, and in fact most of these men 
traced their descent directly from that original 
group who came down from Nipa via Lake 
Kutubu, while the latter were known as the 
a hua, the “longhouse” So’onedobo. There was 
a similar territorial differentiation made within 
the next largest clan in Hegeso, the Orodobo 
clan: there, reference was made to the “Hesa” 
Orodobo, who made their homes, gardens and 
sago stands near the place Hesa along a stretch 
of the bank of the Mubi near the longhouse, 
while another group were called “Yebibu” 
Orodobo, living somewhat further upstream. 
Each of these groups centered around a group 
of full brothers or at most full parallel cousins, 
and it shows that even within the clan, the local 
bridewealth and land-owning unit, territorial 
distinctions were made up to the smallest family 
units possible. This tendency then, has not 
been a response to the presence of petroleum 
revenues, but a mode of differentiation always 
inherent in Foi and Fasu social differentiation 
that was given an additional stimulus by the 
influx of oil revenue. 
Terms such as “Ibuga” or “a hua” and even 
“Foi” itself are names for distinctions, as Roy 
Wagner puts it, rather than names for groups:
They only group people in the way that 
they separate or distinguish them on the 
basis of some criterion, and we cannot 
deduce from the conceptual distinctions 
an actual correspondence of the terms 
with discrete and consciously perceived 
groups of people 
(Wagner 1974: 106-107).
They are, as Wagner concludes, “names, 
rather than the things named” (ibid.).
This distribution of ecological variation is 
replicated at the clan level, the largest nominal 
land controlling unit in the area, and my use of 
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and use were its effective owners. Other clan 
members could dispute these effective owners’ 
decisions concerning disposal of land, but my 
point is that the bigger the local clan the 
less successful it was in reaching clan-wide 
agreement as to the disposition of its resources 
and the more likely it was that individual 
men and/or sets of brothers would arrogate to 
themselves effective power of disposal.
Further, men kept their land-using activities 
if not exactly secret then certainly private. Men 
of the same clan were never certain as to what 
tracts of land or sites specific men had asserted 
claims to. It was a father’s responsibility to take 
his sons around and show them all the spots 
where they had planted permanent tree crops, 
sago and where they had set traps, so that the 
sons could know what spots their father had a 
legitimate claim to as against other men of the 
clan. The only time when this total catalogue 
of inhabited and utilised places was made public 
was in the public poetic recitation of place 
names associated with a man after his death (see 
Weiner 1991).
I make these points if only to suggest that 
caution should be exercised in assuming that 
the clan is by definition a corporate group and 
that it recognises or acts upon a commonality of 
interest. Clansmen were obligated to each other 
to provide support in bridewealth, ceremonial 
exchange and disputes, but the assumption 
of a commonality of interest is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for this sense 
of obligation. The obligations had more to do 
with blood kinship and affinity rather than 
clanship as such.
Recent Petroleum Politics
Historically, a good number of Foi local clans 
throughout the Lake Kutubu and Upper Mubi 
River region can trace their origin to Fasu. 
Typically, in the time before colonial control, 
warfare, homicide, sorcery accusations and the 
like ultimately resulted in the departure of 
clans or other groups of people to new 
homes, sometimes outside of their linguistic 
territory altogether. Many Foi clans of Lake 
Kutubu are also connected to the Fasu through 
more historically proximal affinal and resulting 
maternal connections. Warfare and a generalised 
social aesthetic of compensation ensured that 
movement between villages and regions was 
a constant feature of interior Papua New 
Guinea life. Migration and incorporation into 
a host domain, including the granting of rights 
in territory, were normal features of local 
organisation throughout this broad region. 
the qualifier nominal will be made clear shortly. 
Theoretically, each clan also controls all types 
of subsistence resource within its holdings. But 
here discrepancies are more common, because 
clans are more mobile, more variable in their 
size and more prone to division than are 
longhouse villages. (Longhouse villages came 
about because of the exigencies of warfare, 
raiding and blood feud. Their function is not 
so apparent these days but they nevertheless 
maintain a stability of regional, if not political, 
identity.)
The division of clans into so-called sub-clans 
is a contingent and situational occurrence in Foi 
and is not a uniform or defining part of Foi clan 
organisation. The key distinguishing feature here 
is that the sub-clans are differentiated by name. 
According to Charles Langlas, who worked in 
the Upper Mubi in the mid-60’s, this type 
of division occurs if the local clan “has 
been large in the past, or if part of the 
segment is descended from an immigrant” (1974: 
46-47). Under such conditions, such as occurred 
within the Aidobo clan of Herebo Village, 
intermarriage is even possible and did occur, 
although it elicited disapproval from some clan 
members.
A man and his sons, however, exercise more 
immediate control over specific locales and 
sites within clan territory, just as they exercise 
decisive control over the bridewealth of their 
daughters and sisters. These individual “lines”– 
and the Foi call them ira, meaning “tree” 
and which I have previously glossed as 
“lineages”– are differentiated by the territory 
they inhabit, exploit and control. Groups of 
men related as full brothers or sons of full 
brothers inevitably find themselves living in and 
exploiting contiguous areas of clan land, and 
thus are territorially differentiated from other 
more distantly related groups of agnatically-
related men within the same clan. As I have 
argued elsewhere, a man and his grown sons are 
the effective resource exploitation unit in Foi 
society (Weiner 1986). 
In the mid 1990s, communiques within and 
between both Chevron and the Department of 
Petroleum and Energy evince frustration that 
landowning Incorporated Land Groups (ILG) 
within the Foi-Fasu area are rapidly breaking 
down into what appears to be “family” units, but 
which are most likely these extended lineage-
like ira. The point I am making is that the 
Foi local clan traditionally had only a weakly 
developed form of corporate identity: those of 
its members who asserted control over particular 
tracts of land through long-term habitancy 
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Many of the disputes over landowner status 
among local groups in the wider petroleum 
project area revolve around a consideration of 
just these historical factors of movement and 
re-settlement.
Before the discovery of petroleum, the Foi 
and Fasu were not only jointly administered 
from Pimaga Patrol Post (as they continue 
to be today) but also participated (at least 
nominally in the case of the Fasu) in the 
Foe-Fasu Progress Association1, a non-official 
organisation designed broadly to promote the 
development interests of the region, particularly 
at the Provincial level, where they maintained 
an office in Mendi. Shortly after the petroleum 
was discovered in Fasu territory, the Fasu 
abandoned the Foe-Fasu Progress Association 
and formed their own Namo’aporo Association, 
which also had as an associated organisation 
the Namo’aporo Landowners Association, the 
official representative body of the Fasu 
petroleum land owners. By and large, the two 
associations were coterminous, since virtually all 
Fasu local clans were landowners in this sense. 
The Foe Association was left to represent the 
Foi alone though in this case, there were many 
more non-landowning groups than there were 
landowning ones. These landowning clans are 
in receipt of a regular payment deriving from 
petroleum revenues. Their income is bitterly 
resented by those clans with the misfortune to 
own neither type of land and who do not share 
in these payments. The major problem facing all 
local leaders is how to arrive at a distributive 
agreement that provides some participation by 
all local groups in the receipt of profit from the 
Petroleum project.
We are witnessing new, putatively 
representative organisations such as the Foe 
Association becoming transmuted into more 
traditional forms of oppositional and 
fragmentational social life, because the 
Incorporated Land Group Act enshrines the 
oppositional culture of clan fragmentation in its 
own constitution. What this has led to in the 
Kutubu Oil Project Area is the percolation of 
landowner values and loyalties into local and 
regional politics on a much wider scale than was 
previously the case in this area. 
What might be more desirable, however, is 
the encapsulation and limitation of landowner 
custom so as to allow new forms of democratic, 
representative culture to fill the expanding 
political domain. A hypothesis worth pursuing 
is that more contemporary, representative 
organisations such as political and landowner 
associations are not as subject to fragmentation 
as more traditional land- and genealogical-based 
social units such as clans. This is because such 
associations are founded on a commonality of 
interest. The clan, however, is not a unit in 
which commonality of interest is a political 
underpinning. Its conventions of association are, 
as I have suggested earlier, only tacit, and are 
subject to the oppositional manoeuvres of its 
members. 
It is important to understand that the 
landowning ILGs have interests which are 
distinct from that of their villages, as politico-
residential units. Each village sends a komiti, to 
the Foe Association, but it is the landowning 
ILGs and not the villages per se, which are 
represented by Nixon Mira’s Foe Landowners’ 
Association. Only two of the men who attended 
the Foe Association as representatives of their 
villages also signed their names to Nixon 
Mira’s petition of incorporation for the Foe 
Landowners’ Association as ILG representatives. 
It is important to consider that members of 
the revenue-receiving ILG’s may feel that they 
have a stake in both organisations and feel 
that there is room for both in the total 
landscape of political functions in the Kutubu 
Oil Project Area. Company and Government 
encouragement in this direction might prove to 
have some surprising results. 
1 Officially, the Foi spell their name “Foe”, which was the original spelling employed by Murray Rule, the 
linguist/missionary who first transcribed their language by way of English orthography. I therefore use the term 
“Foi” to refer to the culturally distinct language group I have been studying since 1979, and “Foe” in all the 
contexts which the Foi themselves use this term as official self-designation.
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The actual process of traditional conflict 
resolution resembled modern court hearings, 
with the entire community acting as jurors 
and the presiding judge being the village or 
community elder.  Where necessary, witnesses 
were called upon to assist community elders in 
making their final decision, which was backed 
by community consensus. In some cases, in 
order to assist in peaceful conflict resolution, 
community leaders may have had to plead with 
the accused to accept liability. 
If a conflict involved two different tribes, 
village peace negotiators, with highly developed 
oratorical skills mediated on behalf of their 
respective tribes, with arguments being carefully 
constructed so as to reach a win-win outcome. 
Each tribe aimed not to compromise their 
security, while at the same time ensuring that 
the problem did not escalate into warfare.  In 
order to ensure that the safety of both tribes 
was not compromised, negotiation occurred at 
a carefully agreed upon site.  In extreme 
cases, peace mediators from neighbouring tribes 
volunteer to facilitate communication, however 
sometimes such facilitators deliberately twist 
information with the intention of further 
promoting violence, and warring tribes may 
deliberately misguide peace negotiators so as to 
inflict greater causalities on the enemy tribe. 
Consequences
Traditional warfare was usually destructive. 
However, strict rules and norms governed the 
conduct of warriors, who were expected to 
respect and abide by these rules. Amongst the 
most important rules were not to kill rich 
people (those who had many pigs), women and 
children, with the mutilation of dead bodies 
being similarly prohibited.  While the aim of 
warfare was to kill warriors from enemy tribes, 
warring tribes also engaged in the destruction 
of homes, gardens, and trees. In addition, 
psychological trauma and fear impacted severely 
on men, women, and children. 
Modern Times: Causes of conflict and warfare
Causes of conflict in modern times are 
numerous in quantity and complex in nature, 
for while the traditional causes of conflict 
remain intact, new causes of conflict have also 
emerged.  These include contemporary politics, 
uneven service provision, criminal gangs, envy 
and jealousy, alcohol and indiscriminate attacks, 
each of which I discuss below.
First, contemporary politics differ from 
traditional politics.  Traditional forms of 
leadership were earned, with traditional 
MELANESIAN CONFLICTS
Charles Yala
Within the broader framework of Melanesian 
conflicts, in this section I focus upon conflicts 
and tribal warfare in the Highlands of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG). Discussions presented 
here are based upon personal experiences, 
with specific examples being drawn from the 
Enga and Southern Highlands Provinces. The 
discussion focuses upon aspects of conflict, 
consequences and conflict resolution strategies 
within two time periods; traditional and 
modern.
Traditional Times: Aspects of conflict and 
warfare
The main cause of conflict during traditional 
times was competition over the ownership, 
access and use of resources, particularly land, 
women and pigs.  Conflicts were seen as an 
inevitable part of life and a higher authority 
capable of exerting and enforcing power and 
authority across tribes, regions, and cultural 
groups was absent. In the absence of external 
and overarching authority, the use of physical 
violence was an acceptable means of 
punishment, with violence being the ultimate 
form of punishment dealt to repeat offenders.  
In this context, an individual, a group within 
a clan or a tribe may constitute an offending 
party.  Mistrust and suspicion were integral to 
the survival of individuals, families and tribes 
and with the exception of blood relatives, all 
others were seen and classified as potential 
enemies. Young men were told and trained 
to trust only their blood relatives and they 
were expected to be alert, vigilant and fully 
armed at all times. Long-term solutions to 
conflicts were rare, with all peace settlements 
being temporary compromises. Old wounds were 
therefore expected to re-emerge at any time in 
the form of new conflicts.
Conflict settlement strategies
Conflict settlement involved the community 
and was achieved via consensus building 
amongst stakeholders.  Community involvement 
was integral to the process for various reasons. 
First, it preserves collective memory, placing 
problems and decisions on record. Second, 
for decisions to have meaning, value and 
strength, the presence and participation by key 
community figures was important. 
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leadership responsibilities and honours being 
bestowed on the basis of performance. There 
were three distinct leadership responsibilities 
in traditional times, with warriors providing 
leadership during periods of tribal warfare, public 
orators taking control of public meetings and 
peace negotiations on behalf of their tribe, 
and rich men providing leadership during feast 
ceremonies, trade and compensation payments. 
Warrior leadership was recognised on the 
basis of performances in battle, public orators 
and negotiators were recognised during public 
speeches and peace negotiation ceremonies, 
and rich man leadership emerged from the 
number of pigs one raised, slaughtered or traded. 
The community recognised and bestowed 
the respective leadership responsibilities upon 
qualified leaders. 
In modern politics, financial wealth and 
education are the main determining factors of 
success in leadership.  Thus, in addition to 
leadership claimed on the basis of fighting 
prowess, oratorical skills and ‘traditional’ wealth, 
leadership may now be claimed on the basis of 
education or monetary wealth gained through 
the exploitation of business opportunities.  A 
typical modern day community therefore faces 
serious difficulties in identifying and choosing 
the right political leaders from what has now 
become five different source of leadership. 
Traditional tribal rivalries and alliances 
continue to play a significant role in making 
political leadership choices. The struggle for 
political leadership has further intensified 
because there is a perception that substantial 
wealth may be generated from being a politician. 
All politicians receive political support and 
power from clans and tribes in their regions. 
Businessmen and educated elites are looked 
upon to provide leadership despite their lack 
of leadership ability and credibility. Unlike the 
traditional leadership roles that were earned 
and bestowed upon leaders by the community, 
modern political leadership roles are gained 
through election. All these factors make politics 
a major source of violence and conflict.
Second, the uneven provision of services 
(eg. health, education, transport, and other 
infrastructure) has led to strong rivalry between 
tribes and clans, as the ownership of projects is 
seen to enhance the status and bargaining 
power of tribes. Ownership of these services 
is more important than access to services. 
Neighbouring tribes can be denied services 
by those that host these services, thereby 
marginalising weaker tribes by the use of threats 
of service deprivation. Enemy tribes can also 
aim to destroy these services in retaliation 
for denying access to services. The location 
of services may therefore destabilise the power 
balance and also serve as a catalyst for new 
conflicts and violent warfare. The following 
example from Kompiam district in Enga 
illustrates this point.
A rural health centre was earmarked for 
Yamanda village by the then Premier 
for Enga Province in 1990, however 
no project eventuated because the 
incumbent premier lost the 1991 
provincial election. After the 1992 
national election, the member for 
Kompiam-Ambum planned to construct a 
health centre in a neighbouring village 
called Maramb. As the first construction 
materials were being transported during 
December of 1995 to Maramb, villagers 
from Yamanda stopped and threatened to 
kill the driver, arguing that the health 
centre was earmarked for Yamanda in 
1990. Although no one was injured in 
the incident, a fight broke out the next 
morning between the driver’s tribe and 
tribesmen from Yamanda village. The 
fight lasted five years.  About 30 young 
men were killed and more than 50 
men, women and children died from 
indirect causes such as curable diseases 
and malnutrition.
Third, criminal gangs are now abundant, and 
villagers living near service centres have been 
raped, robbed, and forced to pay illegal charges 
for service use by other villagers. Continued 
abuse of this nature is usually a catalyst for 
violent attack and warfare. 
Fourth, envy and jealousy are rife as only 
some (often educated) people have access 
to services, modern homes and equipment 
including vehicles, and business (shops, 
transport and coffee plantations).  Thus, while 
the publicly acknowledged reasons for initiating 
warfare may not be envy and jealousy, such 
feelings are often the underlying causes of 
destructive warfare.
Fifth, alcohol has become a major cause 
of social problems in PNG, including rape, 
vandalism and physical abuse perpetrated by 
males (usually young) under the influence of 
alcohol.  This is one of the major causes of 
increasing conflict and violence. 
Sixth, modern day payback attacks are 
often indiscriminate and occur in response to 
ethnic and regional tensions.  This results 
from the high mobility of people between 
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provinces, towns, and villages, as illustrated by 
the following incident involving illegal gold 
diggers from the Porgera gold mine.
Recently, illegal gold diggers from 
Laiagam district (Enga) died when a rock 
fell on them at a Porgera mine site. 
Relatives of the deceased men suspected 
that PJV securities were responsible for 
the deaths and thus killed someone from 
Paila (a separate ethnic group from the 
Lagaip-Porgera district) who was wearing 
a PJV security uniform (not a company 
employee) at Laiagam. In retaliation, 
Paila relatives mistakenly killed a man 
from Tari (Southern Highlands) and a 
man from Wabag district who intervened 
to prevent the attack on the Tari man 
at Porgera. Later two men from Porgera 
and two more men from Laigam were 
killed by men from Paiyala at Porgera. 
The Paiyala also ambushed a guesthouse 
at Wali Creek (some kilometres from the 
Porgera mine site) and killed seven men 
from different parts of Enga, including 
one from Kandep district. Kandep 
relatives of the deceased retaliated and 
killed a man who was of mixed parentage 
from Porgera and Paiyala. While these 
killings were occurring in Porgera, men 
from Laigam killed two men from 
Paiyala in Mt.Hagen (Western Highlands 
Province). So far nineteen in total 
(including the two mine victims) are dead 
and the problem has now become an issue 
of Paiyala vs any Engan, irrespective of 
district origin. 
Conflict settlement strategies
The traditional conflict settlement 
framework remains intact and introduced 
dispute settlement systems operate within the 
context of this framework. As one moves from 
the centre (capital cities/towns) to the periphery 
(local remote areas) however, the application 
and enforcement of modern laws diminishes.  
Modern court and legal systems are therefore 
concentrated and effective only in the urban 
centres, while the traditional system remains 
intact and applicable in the rural areas. 
Due to the abundance of arms in the rural 
Highlands of PNG, it is important that violent 
conflicts are rapidly negotiated and settled.  
Negotiators comprise leaders from neighbouring 
tribes, government representatives, the police, 
local businessmen, and politicians, with the type 
of negotiator used depending upon the nature 
and complexity of the conflict. 
It is however, important to point out that 
the use of firearms has complicated conflict 
resolution strategies. For example, a recent 
Southern Highlands tribal fight in Mendi was 
solved with the signing of a peace agreement 
involving businessmen from other parts of the 
province and the police mobile squad from Port 
Moresby. A notable issue in this case was the 
non-surrender of firearms to the police as part 
of the peace plan, a practice that has been used 
in some parts of the Highlands.  Importantly 
however, even when guns are surrendered to 
the police, the gesture is largely symbolic, with 
tribal groups surrendering only a portion of their 
armoury and typically only those weapons that 
are not powerful.
Warring tribes are normally given grace 
periods to fight before initiating conflict 
resolution strategies in order to allow them to 
release their anger and tension.  This means 
that fights may persist for months or years before 
meaningful dialogues for peace are initiated.  
The initiative to settle conflicts peacefully falls 
upon both parties to the conflict, thus no peace 
mission could proceed without the agreement of 
the warring parties.  Police and state authorities 
therefore remain bystanders until invited to 
mediate. 
Educated elites from warring tribes are 
influential in the decision making process 
because they are the main suppliers of guns 
and ammunition. They supply arms in response 
to social pressure, expectations, and obligations 
to their tribesmen. An educated person who 
fails to support their tribe during tribal warfare 
loses face and should they harbour political 
ambitions, their prospects for political success 
are diminished. People listen to and respect 
such educated people largely because their tribes 
depend upon them for arms.
Consequences
The traditional rules and norms governing 
tribal warfare no longer apply in modern 
warfare.  For example, women and children are 
no longer protected and anyone suspected of 
belonging to one regional or ethnic grouping has 
become a target (refer to the Porgera example 
mentioned earlier). This has restricted inter 
and intra regional or cultural group trading 
and communication. Educated elites and local 
business entrepreneurs are prime targets of 
attacks and no educated person is safe to move 
about freely. There have been incidents of 
local tribal enemies attacking enemies in Port 
Moresby. Generally, the majority of the murders 
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committed in urban centres, including Port 
Moresby, are reported as criminal gang attacks. 
This may be misleading because many murders 
may actually be related to tribal warfare.
The impacts of tribal warfare on women 
and children are poorly understood by the 
authorities. First, today women and children 
are targets of attack. Second, women and 
children suffer indirect impacts such as fear, 
curable diseases, and starvation. In terms of 
starvation, during times of warfare, warring 
parties depended entirely upon their extended 
family network for food and shelter. Shortage of 
food is a serious problem because the subsistence 
agricultural system is unable to support a sudden 
increase in population that is concentrated in a 
particular location. Third, there is a long-term 
impact on children and mothers from the death 
of fathers and husbands from warfare. Although 
the tribe looks upon the deceased as heroes, 
the everyday task of raising orphan children 
becomes the sole responsibility of mothers. The 
women and children become more vulnerable 
and remain with both emotional and physical 
hardships throughout their lives, even after 
the fights are over. This is the saddest part 
of tribal warfare. Fourth, during tribal fights 
women’s responsibilities immensely increase. 
They become the sole providers of food and 
care for children.  In addition to finding and 
providing food for their own families, they 
must also provide for warriors and hired 
mercenaries who come to help from other 
tribes. Fifth, the hiring of mercenaries from 
other tribes and regions is an emerging 
problem, with mercenaries being primarily 
ex-servicemen (soldiers, police and correctional 
service personnel) and talented warriors who 
possess high-powered arms. They are usually 
paid with women, pigs and money. Sixth, 
children grow out of school age, which is bad for 
their future.
The destruction of homes, businesses, 
schools, health centres, all forms of 
infrastructure, gardens, and economic trees is a 
typical consequence of tribal warfare, resulting 
in the wasting of resources and retardation of 
development.  The increased use of modern 
and high-powered guns is a national problem 
and virtually every tribe in the Highlands of 
PNG has access to high-powered arms. Educated 
elites, including members of the armed forces 
and external arms traders are involved in the 
illegal arms trade. Because there is a strong 
underlying demand for arms, this problem is 
similar to the global drug trade problem.
Finally, the humanitarian implications are 
enormous. Dead people have been chopped 
into pieces. This is highly barbaric and in 
contravention of all human rights conventions. 
Some of these atrocities in my mind are far 
more than those committed by Milosevic in 
Yugoslavia. The emotional scars left behind by 
these barbaric acts remain and reinforce or 
precipitate new conflicts after many years have 
passed. The key point is that these chopped 
pieces are collected and buried but the story is 
passed on. 
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CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
SIMBU
Abby McLeod
Despite the renowned cultural diversity of 
Papua New Guinea, a comparative reading 
of Weiner and Yala attests the existence 
of continuities in approaches to conflict 
between the peoples of Southern Highlands and 
Enga provinces respectively.  Unlike Southern 
Highlands and Enga however, Simbu Province is 
yet to host major resource extraction operations, 
rendering Simbu conflicts less conspicuous to 
foreign observers.  In the absence of such 
operations, conflict features prominently in 
Simbu lives, with concerns over the oft-cited 
trio of women, pigs and land being directly 
encapsulated within larger battles pertaining to 
politics and the distribution of modern material 
wealth.  
In considering conflict in Simbu Province, 
I engage primarily with Weiner’s discussion of 
‘social rules’ in Papua New Guinea, drawing 
upon fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork 
among the Bari tribe of Kerowagi district.  
While I agree with Yala’s observation that the 
‘traditional’ rules governing tribal warfare have 
eroded dramatically, my observations of small-
scale inter-personal conflicts suggest that such 
interactions continue to be governed largely by 
locally agreed upon rules.  Given that much law 
and order discourse associates the contemporary 
law and order ‘crisis’ with the weakness of the 
Papua New Guinean state, acknowledging the 
persistence of local rules is of great significance 
to policy development, and is in keeping with 
global trends towards community crime control. 
In direct contrast to Western constructions 
of social order, which are predicated upon a 
homeostatic view of society, the Simbu view 
dispute and conflict as inevitable facts of daily 
life, rather than indices of social dysfunction.  
Disputation is a daily occurrence, with the 
majority of disputes occurring within the 
local residential group over issues including 
marital disharmony (adultery, polygyny, spousal 
violence), theft (garden produce, coffee), 
witchcraft accusations and failed obligations 
(monetary and ceremonial).  Typically, minor 
disputes are addressed via bilateral negotiation 
and compensation. Should negotiation fail, 
grievances are aired before male local leaders, 
or more formally before the village court.  
As highlighted by Yala, local mediation 
processes remain largely intact, with ‘traditional’ 
mediation being the primary means through 
which the Bari address dispute.  In the event 
that appeal to state structures may result in 
greater financial reward, the Bari pragmatically 
take their grievances before the village court and 
less frequently, the Kundiawa district court.  
Of greatest concern to outside observers 
of conflict in Papua New Guinea is the 
prevalence of violence, be it tribal warfare, 
armed hold ups or domestic violence, all of 
which feature prominently in national and 
international media.  Alarmist representations 
of violence in Papua New Guinea portray 
such violence as random and uncontrolled, 
reinforcing Western stereotypes of violence as 
irrational and indicative of social dysfunction.  
In some instances, such representations are 
valid.  However, amongst the Bari, as 
throughout Papua New Guinea, violence is also 
one of many remedies that may be legitimately 
employed in response to grievance.  That is, 
the Bari possess a broad variety of remedy 
options ranging from negotiation, mediation and 
compensation through to threat and violent self-
redress.  Typically, violent remedy options are 
employed when ‘talk procedures’ have failed or 
compensation payments have been inadequate, 
with violent self-redress being highly subject to 
community legitimization on the basis of locally 
accepted ‘rules’ and conventions. 
As highlighted by Weiner, in the absence 
of codified rules in a written form, it is often 
difficult for us (outsiders) to understand the 
degree to which the social life of indigenous 
peoples is governed by rules and conventions, 
a fact that has led colonizers throughout the 
globe to declare indigenous peoples devoid of 
‘law’.  The Bari however, do possess codified 
rules known as kitn kaman.  The term kitn kaman 
does not translate easily into English and is 
referred to as both skul (school) and tumbuna 
to (law) in pidgin.  In times past, the male 
initiation process, nembar, and the seclusion of 
women in menstrual huts, apai ikil, provided 
institutionalized learning experiences in which 
the transfer of teachings (kitn kaman) occurred.  
Formalized kitn kaman was also given to young 
men and women on the evening preceding 
their marriage ceremony.  Kitn kaman embraces 
Simbu notions of that which is right and 
wrong, it instils youth with an understanding of 
behavioural expectations and the consequences 
of deviance, and is among the primary 
mechanisms of gender socialization.  In the 
contemporary absence of male initiation and 
female seclusion upon the onset of menses, 
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kitn kaman is transferred to youth in non-
institutionalized settings by their parents.  While 
elders deplore the decreasing knowledge of 
kitn kaman possessed by today’s youth, tumbuna 
to (ancestral law) continues to play an 
important role in the resolution of dispute, with 
‘traditional’ normative rules being frequently 
recited during community attempts to resolve 
disputes.
In addition to kitn kaman, a plethora of 
rules governing Bari sociality are embedded 
in social interaction, and are neither explicit 
nor codified.  The following incident, which 
occurred while I was in the field, illustrates this 
point.
Late one afternoon, Mary’s pig destroyed 
the garden of Cameron’s wife Georgina.  
In a fit of rage, Cameron speared the pig, 
which consequently bled to death.  Upon 
finding Mary’s pig dying, Mary’s brother 
Michael badly beat Cameron (one of his 
classificatory fathers), leaving him with 
a cracked rib.  When discussing the 
incident with an elderly man, I asked 
him to explain to me the various ‘wrongs’ 
committed during the incident.  He began 
by listing a number of rules including ‘one 
must always tether one’s pig’, ‘one must 
get a village court order before killing 
a pig found destroying one’s garden’ and 
‘one must never physically fight with 
one’s brothers and fathers’.  He then said 
‘Michael wokim rong blo wanem em i bin 
abrusim wara na kalapim bikpela mountain 
na paitim papa blo em’ (Michael did the 
wrong thing because he crossed a river 
and went over a big mountain to fight his 
father).  
After protracted discussion, it became clear 
that the man was referring to the fact 
that Michael did not simply lose his temper 
and attack his father, but he had planned 
and premeditated attacking Cameron, severely 
increasing the gravity of his wrongdoing.  While 
when articulating specified rules the elderly man 
did not state ‘one must not plan to attack 
within the men’s house group’, the Bari clearly 
possess ‘rules’ pertaining to the premeditation 
of wrongdoing.  However, given that the 
assessment of wrongdoing is primarily dependent 
upon the nature of the relationship and the 
shared history of disputants, many Bari ‘wrongs’ 
do not lend themselves to codification.  For 
example, while it is unacceptable to premeditate 
attacking a member of one’s men’s house group, 
the premeditation of attacks against members 
of enemy tribes is acceptable and in certain 
circumstances obligatory.  Therefore, amongst 
the Bari, as elsewhere in Papua New Guinea 
(Epstein 1973; Strathern, M. 1975; Scaglion 
1976; Westermark 1981; Banks 1993; Podolefsky 
1992), the social distance between disputants 
is the primary factor impinging upon the 
assessment of wrongdoing. 
Bari rules pertaining to premeditation were 
gradually explicated via public discussion over 
many weeks.  During community discussions, 
it became clear that physical violence was not 
considered a viable remedy among the male 
members of a men’s house group and that intra-
tribal violence was considered excessive if blood 
was drawn or medical treatment necessitated.  In 
this case, the young man’s violence against his 
father was deemed illegitimate and a number 
of sanctions including severe public shaming 
and compensation orders were invoked.  In 
addition, as in all instances of public dispute, 
Bari villagers sought to delineate the root cause 
of the dispute.  In this instance, while concerns 
over the damaged garden were subsumed by 
the unacceptability of physical violence within 
the men’s house group, the pig owner Mary 
(who was living on her father’s land with her 
husband) was labelled kura mapr, or ass trabel 
(the root of the problem) and exiled from the 
men’s house group.
This incident illustrates that while violence 
may be legitimately employed in response 
to grievance by the Bari, there are cases 
in which violent self-redress is considered 
illegitimate should it transgress community 
norms sanctioning its usage.  Furthermore, 
‘traditional’ community sanctions against the 
excessive (and illegitimate) use of inter-personal 
violence continue to operate.  This does not 
suggest an absence of cases in which such 
sanctions fail.  However, there are lessons to be 
learned by examining the intersection between 
state and local notions of violence as rupture, 
as it is from this point that mutually meaningful 
responses to problems of law and order may best 
proceed.  
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